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Abstract:  I use a unique data set of Canadian displaced workers to measure the effects of firm of
employment on wages.  This data set has the advantage of  consisting of a sample of workers
changing jobs for reasons (product demand shifts or technological changes) that are largely
orthogonal to their individual levels of “ability”. It is also drawn from a labor market with wage-
setting institutions that are quite similar to the U.S.  My main findings are that, even within
narrowly-defined industries, there are economically large and statistically significant firm wage
effects that cannot be accounted for by unobserved worker heterogeneity.  For a number of
reasons, including the evidence I present on tenure, these effects are not easily attributable to
compensating differentials, thus suggesting a role for models in which job rents play a role.
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1. Introduction
According to the simplest competitive model of labor markets, identical workers should
earn identical wages, regardless of the firm at which they are employed.  The empirical relevance
of this model has, however, recently been questioned by a number of authors (e.g. Groshen,
1991a,b; Abowd et al., 1995; Bronars and Famulari, 1997), who find large and significant firm
wage effects in different samples of workers.  This suggests possibly important roles for
alternative conceptualizations of the labor market, including various types of equilibrium search
models (Manning, 1994; Burdett and Mortenson, 1998), efficiency-wage models (Bulow and
Summers, 1986), or rent-sharing models (Christofides and Oswald, 1992).  
While the available evidence on firm wage effects is highly suggestive, it must still be
interpreted with some caution.  For example, studies of firm wage effects based on cross-section
data (e.g. Groshen, 1991a,b; Bronars and Famulari, 1997; Barth, 1997) face the same difficulty as
comparable studies of industry wage effects: they may simply reflect the sorting of workers, by
productivity, across firms (Krueger and Summers, 1988; Gibbons and Katz, 1992).  As is well
known, this problem can be addressed using panel data, but such studies are rare (Abowd et al.,
1995, is the best example), and face some data-induced limitations of their own.
In this paper I use a unique data set of Canadian displaced workers to measure the effects
of firm of employment on wages.  While much smaller in size than the large administrative data
sets used in some other studies, this data set has the important advantages of  (a) containing a
fairly complete set of measures of workers’ demographic characteristics; (b) consisting of a
sample of workers changing jobs for reasons (product demand shifts or technological changes)
that are largely orthogonal to their individual levels of “ability”, and (c) being drawn from a labor2
market with wage-setting institutions that are quite similar to the U.S.  My main findings are that,
even within narrowly-defined industries, there are economically large and statistically significant
firm wage effects that cannot be accounted for by unobserved worker heterogeneity.  For a
number of reasons, including the evidence I present on tenure, these effects are not easily
attributable to compensating differentials, thus suggesting a role for models in which job rents
play a role.  
Models of the labor market in which job rents exist can have very different implications for
the effects of various policies on employment, unemployment and wages (e.g. Bulow and
Summers, 1986). Knowing that job rents are quantitatively important also has implications for the
design of policies designed to reduce wage inequalities, both among and within groups, (e.g.
England, 1992).  The evidence presented here that firms do matter (and indeed in North America
at least they seem to matter  a lot) thus may have important implications for how we view labor
markets and how we design policies affecting them.  
Section 2 discusses possible explanations for firm wage effects in cross section data and
reviews the existing empirical literature.  Section 3 briefly describes the data set; Section 4
presents results and Section 5 concludes.
2. Firm Wage Effects: Existing Evidence and Explanations.
Groshen (1991b) discusses five reasons for the existence of  firm wage premia.  They are:
Explanations for Empirical Firm Wage Differentials
(Groshen, 1991b)3
1. Firms sort workers by unmeasured productivity.
2. Compensating wage differentials.
3. Information costs and other frictions.
4. Firms pay efficiency wages.
5. Workers capture rents.
The first two explanations posit no “true” wage effects; in each case, empirical firm wage
effects are simply an artifact of measurement problems.  If the econometrician could completely
measure productivity and non-pecuniary aspects of compensation, the firm wage effects would
disappear.  Sorting of workers across firms by productivity differences arises in “team
production” models  (Kremer, 1993; Rosen, 1982).  The notion of compensating wage
differentials is exposited  in any labor economics text. 
The third explanation posits that firm wage premia may arise either randomly (perhaps due
to error) or by design and can persist because of information costs and other frictions.  This
explanation would of course encompass general equilibrium search models of the labor market
(Burdett and Mortensen, 1998).  Note that these frictions need not be in the labor market. 
Frictions in capital markets will allow firms to persist in paying above market wages.
The fourth explanation refers to the idea that the optimal wage for some firms (or a
sector) may be above the market clearing wage (see for example, Weiss, 1990).  The final
explanation rests on the existence of  rents (perhaps due to product market imperfections) that
accrue to workers either as a result of their bargaining power or the benevolence of managers.
Groshen (1991b) suggests that the first three explanations  are competitive explanations in
the sense that the labor market clears.  In the cases of efficiency wages and rent sharing, there
should be queues for high paying jobs.  From an empirical view, an important distinction is4
     
1 In fact, what must be assumed is that unmeasured productivity can be divided into two
components: one that is individual specific and time invariant (often referred to as "ability") and a
second which is uncorrelated with observables. Furthermore, the fixed individual characteristic
must generate the same return in different jobs. 
between an explanation based on unmeasured differences in worker characteristics or (possibly
non-pecuniary) compensation (that is sorting or “mismeasurement” based explanations)  and those
based on characteristics or policies of firms.  Groshen’s first two explanations are of the former
type.  A primary goal of this paper is determine whether observed firm effects are simply artifacts
of such empirical problems.
Groshen’s empirical results have since been replicated on other cross section data sets. For
example significant firm wage differentials are reported by  Bronars and Famulari (1997)  in a
U.S. sample of white collar workers and Barth (1997) in Norwegian Data.  Nonetheless, there is a
limit to what we can learn about firm wage effects from cross section data.  A central difficulty in
studying firm wage effects (or inter-industry wage differentials) is the unobservability of
productivity. Productivity is generally proxied by observable "productive characteristics", which
are suggested by human capital theory: education, training, experience and seniority (tenure).  If
one then looks for the effects of "nonproductive characteristics" on wages, one runs the risk that
these characteristics may simply capture part of the effect of the unmeasured component of
productivity.  As is well known, if multiple observations on each worker are available, it is
possible to remove at least the fixed component of unmeasured productivity by first differencing.
1 
Simply put, if firm wage effects reflect worker characteristics, they should persist when workers
move to a new firm.  Groshen (1991a) and other authors employing  cross sectional data can only
control for observable individual characteristics.5
     
2 Note that this assumption is almost certainly not valid for workers displaced on an individual
basis.
If one follows a random sample of workers through time (with a panel data set) firm (and
industry, and union) effects are identified entirely from the subsample of job changers.  Precisely
because these individuals are choosing to move, they may be drawn from firms, or moving to
firms, who are outliers in the distribution of firm wage effects.  This is the strategy pursued by
Abowd, Kramarz and Margolis (1995, forthwith AKM), who explore the issue of worker sorting
versus "true"  firm wage effects with a French panel data set. 
Ideally, one would like to observe in two jobs a sample of workers whose mobility was
randomly assigned.  If one focuses on workers displaced by plant closures and mass layoffs, data
from displaced worker surveys  reasonably approximate  this experiment.  This is the strategy
pursued in this paper.  This exercise parallels that undertaken by Gibbons and Katz, for industry
wage effects (1992).  The crucial assumption is that, for these workers, displacement is
orthogonal to the individual characteristics (particularly unobserved characteristics).
2   All the
workers studied in this paper change jobs after a plant closure or mass layoff.  In contrast, AKM
have no information on reason for separation
AKM  report that they find statistically significant firm fixed effects, but  that these are
dwarfed in magnitude by individual effects. Two further  aspects of the AKM study are important
in light of this result.  First, AKM have rather limited information  about worker characteristics
(such as education).  If they are measuring time- invariant worker characteristics with
considerable error, this may contribute substantially to the large individual effects they observe. 
Superior controls for individual characteristics is an important advantage of the current paper. 6
Secondly, the importance of firm wage effects may depend considerably on national wage-setting
institutions; it would be interesting to see whether AKM’s result of small firm wage effects carries
over to contexts, such as the U.S. or Canada, where individual firms have much more discretion
over wage-setting than they do in France.
Finally, the literature has not evaluated compensating wage differentials as an explanation
of firm wage effects.  Thus this paper complements the work of AKM and others.  The most
important disadvantage of displaced worker data is that it represents a nonrandom sample of
firms.  All the firms from which these workers are sampled are contracting in size. In the
conclusion, I discuss the possible implications of this for the interpretation of my results.
3. Data.
The data employed in this survey come from an Ontario Ministry of Labor Survey of
workers displaced in 21 mass layoffs or plant closures in 1980 or 1981.  The sample frame was
constructed from personnel records provided by the firms; thus each worker surveyed can be
matched to their pre-displacement firm.  The survey collected information on standard
demographics, human capital measures and hourly wages both in the pre-displacement job and in 
re-employment.  Summary statistics for the data are presented in Table A1.1.  Further
descriptions of the data can be found in Ontario Ministry of Labour (1983), Crossley et al. (1994)
and Jones and Kuhn (1995).
Each job observed in the data was assigned an extremely detailed (7 digit) occupation
code from the Canadian Classification and Dictionary of Occupations (CCDO).  This aspect of the
data allows a crude view of the internal hierarchies of the firms; it is possible to identify7
supervisors within narrow occupations for example.  In addition, the CCDO rates each detailed
occupation on a broad series of  measures including both required aptitudes (such as numerical, 
verbal and physical abilities) and conditions of work (such as injury risk and environmental
exposure).  These can be used to infer the characteristics of each worker’s job.  An extensive
discussion of aspects of the data pertinent to firms and jobs can be found in Crossley (1998a).
There is now  considerable evidence of inter-industry wage differentials (Krueger and
Summers, 1988) at fine levels of  industry disaggregation.  In order to isolate firm wage effects, it
will be necessary to condition on industry.  In this paper I consider three levels of industrial
structure. I define "sector" to correspond to SIC division. Of the 21 firms, 19 are in the
manufacturing sector, while the other two are in unique sectors (financial and service).  Since for
these two firms I will not be able to disentangle firm effects from industry effects even at this high
level of industry aggregation, I drop them from my empirical analysis and focus only on
manufacturing firms.  The 2 digit industries correspond to SIC major groups. At this level of
industrial disaggregation, 7  manufacturing firms are in unique industries. I can estimate firm wage
differentials for the 12 firms in the food and beverage, textile, transportation equipment and
electrical products industries.  If I control for 4 digit industry (SIC minor groups) I can estimate
firm wage differentials for the 3 firms in the carpet, mat and rug industry and for the 3 firms in the
motor vehicle parts and accessories industry.  The break down of firms by different levels of
industrial disaggregation is presented in Table  A2.2.
Because of the elapsed time between the displacements and the survey (less than 2.5
years), there is some selection into re-employment at the survey date.  An analysis of this problem
is can also be found in Crossley (1998a); it does not seem to significantly affect the results8
presented in this paper, as is discussed in section 4.2.
4. Results.
4.1 Firm Wage Effects in Cross Section.
Table 1 reports mean real hourly wages at the 19 firms under consideration.  Evidently,
there were considerable differences in the mean wages paid by these firms.  Of course, the firms
might well employ very different kinds of  labor.  I begin my empirical exploration of inter-firm
wage variation by estimating firm wage effects in cross sectional pre-displacement wage
equations.  In Table 2  I report the explanatory power of  alternatively specified wage equations.
The firm dummies alone account for 57% of the raw variation in log wages. The (weighted)
standard deviation of the raw firm wage differentials is 0.224, compared to the standard deviation
of log wages of 0.299.  Simple human capital measures can only explain 29% of the raw variation
in log wages, while a fully specified wage equation, including human capital measures,
demographics and 2 digit industry controls has an R
2 of 0.65.  Thus a worker’s employer is a
better mean square error predictor of wages than the characteristics of the worker.  Adding firm
controls to this human capital specification accounts for an additional 8% of the variation in log
wages.  Of course, worker characteristics are not randomly distributed across firms.  However,
even if we attribute  all the possible variance in wages to individual characteristics, firms still
explain a substantial fraction of the residual.
In Table 3 I report estimates of firm wage differentials conditional on different sets of
industry controls.  The dependent variable is the logarithm of pre-displacement real hourly wages.
Each regression includes controls for human capital, demographics, and job characteristics9
     
3 Through out I employ a heteroscedasticity consistent estimate of the covariance matrix. A
test for different error variances across firms rejects the null hypothesis of homoskedasticity at
standard significance levels. 
     
4 Note that the mean within industry differential is zero.
(including union status), as well as industry and firm dummies.  I report firm wage differentials,
following the procedure introduced by  Krueger and Summers (1988) for industry wage
differentials.  The wage differential for firm  i is the coefficient on the relevant firm dummy (0 for
the omitted firm) minus the weighted mean of all the coefficients on the firm dummies within a
particular industry (including 0 for the omitted firm in each industry).  Differentials so calculated
are invariant to which firm is omitted.  Following Haisken-DeNew and Schmidt (1997) I calculate
the corrected standard errors for each differential.  Moving from left to right in Table 3, I control
for progressively finer inter-industry wage differences.  Even controlling for 4 digit industries
(column 3), I find statistically significant intra-industry firm wage effects.  These effects also have
economic significance.  For example, a worker at Txtl4 could expect to earn approximately 10%
less than the wages she could expect  in the carpet industry. 
At the bottom of each column I report summary measures of the statistical and economic
significance of the firm wage differentials.  The F statistics for the joint significance of the firm 
dummies confirms that they are statistically significant at the 0.001 level, regardless of the level of
disaggregation in industry controls.
3 
The WSE is the weighted standard error of the firm differentials.  To calculate this I take
the weighted (by observations) sum of the squared firm differentials,
4 divide by the sum of the
weights (the sample size), correct for sampling variation (Haisken-DeNew and Schmidt, 1997)
and take the square root.  It gives a measure of the amount of wage variation in the sample10
     
5In percentage terms a 0.12 log point premia, for example,  is [1-e
-0.12 ]*100 = 11.3%.
attributable to the wage differentials, and has the same units as the wage differentials.  The WSE
is 0.18 log points in manufacturing and 0.12 log points within two digit industries.  Thus a worker
at a firm paying one standard deviation above the industry norm could expect to earn a 0.12  log
point  premium.  This is quite substantial when compared to the unconditional standard deviation
of log wages at 0.30.
5  It is also quite substantial when compared to premia that accrue to specific
individual characteristics. For example, relative to having only elementary education, highschool
completion is associated with average wages that are only 0.053 log points higher, and some
tertiary education a further 0.047 log points beyond that. 
There is evidence of worker sorting by productivity differences.  Conditioning on
observable characteristics reduces the WSE of firm differentials from 0.22 to 0.18 in
manufacturing and from 0.16 to 0.12 within two digit industries. 
In Table 4 I report the coefficients on worker characteristics estimated with and without
the firm dummies.  These are the OLS and "within" estimates respectively.  The difference in
some coefficients is striking.  For example, the cross sectional returns to tenure are substantially
reduced when estimated using only the variation in wage and tenure within firms.  Cross sectional
estimates of the returns to tenure are often thought to be upwardly biased because more able or
better matched workers have longer tenures.  The latter intuition is confused; in a cross section of
interrupted tenures it is not necessarily the case that short tenures represent poor matches.
Nonetheless, in this data it appears that high tenure workers are employed  at high paying firms.  I
investigate this in a second paper (Crossley, 1998b).  It is also apparent that the gender gap within
these firms is about half of what it is in the pooled data.  The implication is that a substantial11
     
6 Full estimation results are available from the author.
     
7 Because these variables vary only  across (rather than within) firms, it is not possible to
control for them by adding them to a wage regression with firm dummies.
fraction of the gender gap is attributable to the fact that women are disproportionately employed
in low wage firms.
The next three subsections, and the remainder of the tables, investigate the plausibility of 
alternative explanations of the cross sectional wage differentials summarized above.  I pay
particular attention  to “mismeasurement” explanations: unobserved ability (Section 4.2) and
compensating differentials  (Section 4.3).  To do this, I present alternative estimates of the firm
wage differentials that exploit the longitudinal nature of the data, employ alternative samples, or
augment the basic cross section specification with additional controls.  For each estimation, I
present the F statistic for the exclusion of the firm dummies, and the weighted standard deviation
(WSE) of the firm wage differentials.  In the bottom panel of each tables, I present the
correlations between the sets of wage differentials arrived at via the alternative specifications or
samples.  These correlations are weighted by the number of respondents from each firm - this
roughly weights the differentials according to their precision.
6   
I also present evidence on the correlates of the wage differentials: characteristics of the
firms and the local labor markets they operated in.
7  Throughout, I focus on the firm wage
differentials within two digit industries.
4.2. Are Firm Wage Effects Unobserved Ability?
In the previous section I presented evidence that conditioning on observable
characteristics reduced the  apparent firm wage differentials.  Clearly workers sort by productive12
characteristics.  I now turn to the role of unobserved worker heterogeneity in explaining empirical
firm wage effects.  I consider evidence based on job characteristics and on the longitudinal aspect
of the data.
One way to pick up unobserved skill differences between workers at firms in the same
industry is to condition on the typical skill requirements of the narrow occupations of the
workers.  I present the results of this exercise in Column 2 of Table 7.  My base cross section
regression includes the following occupational controls: blue collar supervisor, white collar
worker, white collar supervisor, professional, manager.  The omitted category is a blue collar
worker without supervisory responsibilities. Here I augment these controls with measures of the
intelligence, strength, spatial thinking, and manual dexterity typically required in the job held by
each worker.  These controls are jointly statistically significant, but only the intelligence measure
is individually significant. The intelligence measure is a five point scale (with 5 being the highest),
and over 90% of the workers in the data are displaced from jobs ranking 2 or 3.  The coefficient
on this measure is 0.06, with a t-value over 6.  For the current exercise, the important finding is
that these controls diminish neither the statistical or economic significance of the firm wage
effects (as measured by the F test for exclusion of the firm dummies and the WSE of the firm
wage differentials, respectively).
Following the Gibbons and Katz (1992) analysis of inter-industry wage differentials, I
exploit the longitudinal nature of displaced worker data in two ways.  First, I estimate first
difference wage equations, hoping to net out unobserved but fixed individual effects.  Gibbons
and Katz point out that if the component of unmeasured ability that is sorted by industry (in the
current context: firm) is time invariant and generates the same return in different jobs, then13
     
8 The data does include post-displacement firm identifiers. However, more than half of those
workers who are re-employed at the survey date are employed at a unique post-displacement firm.
industry (firm) wage effects can be consistently  estimated by wage change regression for industry
(firm) switchers.  Second I examine the role of pre-displacement firms in determining post-
displacement wages.  If unmeasured ability is sorted across pre-displacement firms, then pre-
displacement firm dummies will proxy for unmeasured ability in a post-displacement wage
equation.  A simple empirical framework which captures these arguments is presented in
Appendix 1.
Unfortunately, I cannot repeat Gibbons and Katz’s exercise exactly for firm wage effects.
In particular, I cannot control for post-displacement firms.
8  This means that, under the
assumption that there are true firm wage effects, my first difference regression will be misspecified
by the exclusion of post-displacement firm controls and hence the first difference estimates of pre-
displacement firm wage effects may be biased.  However, if a worker displaced from a "high"
wage firm is more likely to move to another "high" wage firm, then the first difference regression
will  underestimate pre-displacement firm wage effects.  This is because the observed wage losses
will be less than those that would occur if a workers were re employed at random firms.  Thus, I
argue that this bias has the opposite sign to the bias in the cross section regression, and that the
first difference estimates give us a lower bound on the magnitude of firm wage effects.   These
arguments are also developed in the empirical framework of Appendix 1.
Table 5 summarizes the longitudinal estimates of the firm wage effects and compares them
to the cross section estimates.  Each column summarizes a different sample or estimation strategy.
In each case I present the weighted standard error of the firm wage differentials, and an F test for14
     
9 For full details, see Crossley (1998a).
     
10  This is also true of estimates of the returns to standard worker characteristics (Crossley
1998a).
the significance of the firm dummies.  In the bottom panel of the table I present the correlation
between the alternate estimates of firm wage estimates.  In calculating the correlations, each of
the estimates of each firm’s wage differential are weighted by the number of observations from the
firm, giving greater weight to the more precisely estimated premia.
The first column of Table 5 summarizes again, for purposes of comparison, the full sample
cross section estimates, from column 2 of Table 3.  The next column presents a second set of
cross section estimates, based on the restricted sample of workers re-employed by the survey
date.  Longitudinal estimates must be restricted to this sample so these estimates provide a basis
for comparison.  They also provide, through comparison with the full sample estimates, a check of
the effects of sample selection on estimates of the firm wage premia.  An initial investigation
indicated that, conditional on a full set of individual and job characteristics and on place of
employment, those who would go on to re-employment by the survey date earned approximately
6% more in their pre-displacement jobs.
9  Thus selection into re-employment is clearly correlated
with unobserved variation in remunerable characteristics.  However, as Table 5 reports, the cross
section estimates of firm wage premia on the re-employed sample are almost identical to those
based on the full sample.
10   Furthermore, the longitudinal estimates employed explicitly account
for fixed individual differences in earnings power. 
The first difference estimates are summarized in the third column of Table 5.  The
dependent variable is the logarithm of post-displacement real hourly wages minus the logarithm of15
pre-displacement real hourly wages.  In addition to pre-displacement firm I include controls for
changes in job characteristics and human capital measures and industry switches.  I control only to
the level of the two digit industry, because I do not have sufficient observations to estimate the
effects of four digit industries after displacement. 
From the F statistic, it appears that the difference (or fixed effect) estimates of the intra-
industry firm wage effects are statistically significant.  They also remain economically significant:
based on the first difference estimates a worker at Txtl4 could expect to earn 0.11 log points less
than the wages she could expect elsewhere in the textile industry.  However, they are significantly
smaller than the cross section estimates: the WSE falls by about half.  Finally, note that the wage
differentials based on the difference estimates are highly correlated with those based on cross
section estimates.
 Pre-displacement firms will affect post-displacement wages if either (1) firms sort workers
by unmeasured ability or if (2) a worker displaced from a high wage firm is more likely to be re-
employed at a high wage firm than an identical worker displaced from a low wage firm. 
Therefore the regression of post-displacement wages on pre-displacement wages captures the bias
in both the cross section and first difference estimates of firm wage effects.  Again, this is
illustrated in Appendix 1.  The results of this exercise are presented in the fourth column of Table
5.  The dependent variable is the log of real hourly post-displacement wages.  I control for human
capital, demographics, post-displacement job characteristics (union status and blue collar/white
collar) and post-displacement industry.  After controlling for these things, pre-displacement firm is
a significant determinant of post-displacement wages.  This suggests that either the cross section
or the first difference estimates, and possibly both, are biased.16
Under the assumption that workers displaced from a “high wage” firm are no more (or
less) likely to be re-employed at a “high wage” firm than those displaced from a “low wage” firm,
the WSE of the difference and post-displacement estimates give a rough decomposition of the
cross section wage differentials into the part due to sorting across firms by unobserved ability
(captured by the post-displacement estimates) and the part that cannot be explained by sorting
(captured by the difference estimates).  Under this assumption, sorting may account for just less
than half of the firm wage differentials observed in cross section.
If this assumption does not hold, then the difference estimates of the firm wage
differentials (both positive and negative) are likely biased towards zero (see Appendix 1) and
consequently the WSE of the “true” firm wage effects biased down.  In sum, the results indicate
that there is significant sorting of workers across firms by unobserved characteristics, but that firm
wage effects can not be completely or even largely explained by sorting of workers by
unmeasured ability. 
4.3. Are Firm Wage Effects Compensating Differentials?
The firm wage effects could reflect compensating differentials.  The longitudinal estimates
of Table 5 do not shed any additional evidence on the plausibility of this explanation without a
strong assumption about the source of heterogeneity in the compensating differentials.  If for
example, all the heterogeneity is in worker preferences (so that there is a single technological
frontier) then it might be reasonable to assume that, after displacement, workers return to a job
with a similar tradeoff between wage and non-pecuniary characteristics.  Thus non-pecuniary
characteristics of the job could be treated as a fixed effect.  This story completely breaks down if
there is heterogeneity in technology, that is, if firms as well as workers differ in the rates they are17
     
11  A less automated firm might employ a greater proportion of its workers directly in the
production process.
     
12  Specifically: managers, professionals, white collar supervisors, other white collar workers,
blue collar supervisors, other blue collar workers.
willing to trade off wages against other job characteristics (see Appendix 1 for a further
exposition of this argument).
Rather than make such an assumption, I present a number of other pieces of evidence on
the compensating wage differentials explanation.  First, I simply point out that there are significant
wage differentials within very narrowly defined (4-digit) industries (Table 3, column 4).  This
rules out as an explanation differences in job characteristics to do with the products or common
technology of industries.  We need to consider instead differences in the non-wage conditions of
work at different auto-part manufacturers or carpet weavers. 
It could be the case that technological differences across firms cause each to employ a
different occupation mix of workers.  A “high wage” firm, for example, might be one that
employs (relative to industry norms) a larger number of workers in risky occupations.
11   While my
basic estimates control for differences between several types of workers,
12   I simply do not have
enough data to control for finely disaggregated occupational effects.  Fortunately, the matched
job characteristics by detailed occupation allow a way around this.  Rather than condition on
occupation, I condition on measures of the typical job characteristics in that very narrow (4 digit)
occupation.  In particular, I include dummies which indicate whether jobs in a respondent’s 4 digit
occupation typically involve a risk of injury, exposure to extremes of heat or cold, and exposure
to air or noise pollution.  The results are summarized in Column 3 of Table 7.  These additional
controls are jointly statistically significant in the wage regression, with risk of injury and exposure18
to cold being  individually significant. There appear to be positive compensating differentials for
injury risk ( 0.04 log points) and cold (0.31 log points).  None-the-less, it is obvious from the F
statistic and WSE (comparing to column 1) that they do not diminish the economic or statistical
significance of the firm wage differentials.  Furthermore, differentials so estimated are almost
perfectly correlated with those from the base specification.  This would seem to preclude a model
in which, within an industry, the non-pecuniary characteristics of jobs is common, but the mix of
jobs varies across firms.
Thus if compensating differentials are to explain the firm wage differentials apparent in this
data, it must be the case that some of the firms differ from industry norms in the non-pecuniary
compensation they offer to workers in particular jobs.  Being a machinist at one auto parts
manufacturer must be a riskier or more unpleasant job than being a machinist at another auto parts
firm.  In columns 2, 3 and 4 of Table 6 I present estimates of the firm wage differentials based on
the subsamples of blue collar workers, white collar workers, and white collar workers excluding
managers and professionals,  respectively.  In all cases the differentials are statistically significant,
and are of the same magnitude as, and are highly correlated with, differentials estimates on the full
sample and with each other.  Thus firm wage premia seem to be paid to all workers at a firm. 
This is inconsistent with the notion that one firm may have, for example, poorer plant safety or
inferior plant air quality (in this case, the compensating differential would presumably only be paid
to production workers).  Interestingly, there is some evidence that the firm wage differentials are
less consistent among managerial and professional workers. Bronars and Famulari (1997) report
similar evidence of firm wage premia that are consistent across occupation groups.  They interpret
this as evidence of sorting, as predicted by models of team production.  The longitudinal data19
     
13  Fringe benefits, for example.
employed in this paper provides a much more direct test of that hypothesis.  As the previous
section reported, I do find direct evidence of such sorting, but it is at best a partial explanation for
firm wage differentials.
It remains possible that certain firms, within narrow industries, might offer a non-
pecuniary benefit to all their workers.
13   In Tables 8 and 9 I present correlates of firm wage
premia, by way of rankings and simple regressions respectively.  The one strong pattern apparent
in Tables 8 and 9 is the positive relationship between average tenure (at displacement) of workers
at a firm and the firm’s wage premium.  High tenure workers are disproportionally represented at
“high wage” firms.  Such a result suggests that a positive firm wage premium is associated with
reduced turnover, and is consistent with a rents-based explanation for the wage premia. Krueger
and Summers (1988) find a similar relationship between industry wage premia and tenure; they
interpret this as evidence for a rents based explanation of those premia and against a
compensating differentials based explanation.  In a compensating differentials equilibrium marginal
workers should be indifferent between “high” and “low” wage firms, and those should not
experience different worker mobility.  A second model that is consistent with long tenures at high
wage firms is a general equilibrium search model (Burdett and Mortensen, 1998) in which firms
have some monopsony power and differentiate their compensation strategies along an isoprofit
curve in wage-turnover space.
Finally I note that, as shown in Table 8, there is very little difference in mean reported
weekly hours of work across the plants, suggesting that firm wage differentials are not a premia
paid for differences in hours of work.  While I cannot address the compensating differentials20
explanation as directly as the sorting explanation, the preponderance of evidence seems to suggest
that compensating differentials cannot be a complete explanation of the firm wage differentials
observed in this data.
4.4. Additional Specification Checks and Correlates of Firm Wage Effects.
In this final section I present a number of additional specification checks, each addressing
a potential explanation for the firm wage differentials, and investigate some correlates of those
differentials. 
Differing conditions in very fine local labor markets have been suggested as an important
determinant of displaced workers’ wage losses (Carrington,1992).  Furthermore, if firm wage
effects reflect differences in monopsony power, they should be correlated with measures of the
competitiveness of the local labor market.  Local populations and unemployment rates are
reported alongside the wage differentials in Tables 8 and do not seem to correspond to the pattern
of wage effects.  I have also approached this with simple regressions of the estimated firm wage
differentials on these local labor market characteristics (Table 9).  There may be some relationship
between the size of the local market and pay, but only if Toronto is excluded.  I have no rationale
for this result.
Unlike firm wage differentials, a firm size effect on wages is well known (Brown and
Medoff, 1989).  Table 8 also reports the size of each firm’s operations in Canada and the size of
the layoffs.  For the 16 firms which experienced plant closures, the latter is a measure of plant
size.  There appears to be no obvious relationship between these numbers and the estimated firm
differentials within two digit industries.  Additional evidence is presented in the first row of Table
9.  Evidently the individual firm wage effects I find in this data are not a firm size effect.21
While the OML data contains hourly wages for each worker, not all the workers were paid
on an hourly basis (that is, in some cases the hourly wage is calculated).  To examine the
possibility that the firm wage effects are capturing differential wage measurement error across the
firms, I re-estimated the firm wage differentials on the sample of workers who were paid on an
hourly basis.  The results are in the fifth column of Table 6. These firm wage differentials so
estimated are just as statistically and economically significant as, and are almost perfectly
correlated with, the base case.
Table 8 presents the fraction of workers at each firm who report union coverage.  The
wage regressions I use to estimate the firm wage differential include a control for union coverage.
However, since they also contain firm dummies, the union wage differential is estimated from the
differences in the wages of covered and uncovered workers  within firms.  In fact, the “within”
estimate of the union wage differential (Table 4) is negative.  Presumably, the union dummy is
picking up occupational differences in pay within firms that are not captured by my occupational
(job level) controls.  Thus “high wage” firms could be unionized firms. Inspection of Table 8
reveals that unionization is likely part of the story in the transportation equipment industry, but
not in the textile industry or food industries.  Table 9 confirms that unionization is not an
adequate explanation of the observed firm wage premia.
Finally, I have considered the possibility that firms offer compensation schemes that differ
in their starting wage and rate of wage growth, but that have the same present value.  The final
column of Table 5 addresses this issue.  In fact, I find statistically significant differences across
firms in their cross sectional wage tenure relationships.  With a linear specification of the wage-
tenure relationship,  the weighted standard error of yearly percentage growth in wages is 0.0037.22
     
14 The median (interrupted) tenure in the data is 10 years, and the 75
th  percentile is 16 years.
Firms with above average intercepts have flatter wage-tenure profiles; the correlation between
slopes and intercepts is -0.34, which is statistically significant at the 0.01% level. Similar results
are reported by Bronars and Famulari (1997) and AKM (1995).  In a wage loss regression the
weighted standard error of the slopes rises to 0.0062 and the correlation of slopes with intercepts
becomes more strongly negative at -0.65.  However, there does not appear to be sufficient “cross
over” for this relationship between wage levels and wage growth across firms to explain for the
apparent firm wage effects.  For both the cross section and first difference estimates, the rank
ordering of predicted wage levels (by firms) at 20 years of tenure
14  remains positively correlated
with the rank ordering of predicted starting wages.  Additionally, the apparently lower turnover at
high-wage-level firms is a puzzle, if the firm wage premia are to be explained by compensating
differences in wage growth (one might expect  higher turnover at high-wage-level/low-wage-
growth firms).  Of course, there are well known difficulties in the interpretation of the cross
sectional relationship between wages and tenure - or even first difference estimates  - as wage
growth (See Crossley, 1998b, for example).  These difficulties can only be exacerbated if there is 
firm heterogeneity in offered wage profiles (Margolis, 1995).
5. Summary and Conclusions.
Most studies of wage heterogeneity focus on the returns to observable worker
characteristics estimated in a human capital wage regression framework.  The focus is on the
supply side of the labor market.  Augmenting that framework, this paper has presented new23
evidence that firm of employment appears to be an empirically significant source of wage
heterogeneity.  Even more than inter-industry wage differentials, these effects are  prima facie
evidence against the simple competitive model of the labor market, and its underlying
assumptions.
A simple competitive model of the labor market can be “rescued” from these results by
assuming that they are simply the empirical artifact of the empirical difficulty of measuring
productivity and compensation.  I consider the two most common variants of this proposition: the
idea that workers sort across firms according to unmeasured productivity (“ability”), and the idea
that the firm wage effects represent compensation for non-pecuniary characteristics of
employment at particular firms (compensating wage differentials).
If firm wage premia represent unmeasured characteristics of workers, then workers should
continue to earn those premia if they switch firms.  This is only partially borne out in this data. In
fact, using the longitudinal nature of the data, I conclude that sorting of workers across firms by
unobserved ability can explain less than half of the observed differentials.  This result, that firm
fixed effects are at least as important as individual fixed effects, contrasts with that of Abowd et
al. (1995, denoted AKM) who report that firm effects are dwarfed by individual fixed effects in a
French panel data set.  There are two possible explanations for this disparity.  First, I have better
controls for individual worker characteristics than AKM.  This reduces the size of the  unobserved
worker effects, relative to the firm effects.  Second, France has more centralized wage setting
institutions than Canada, so that one would expect less firm wage heterogeneity in France than in
Canada.
Firm wage differentials are observed within narrow industries, are consistent across broad24
occupational groups, are robust to conditioning on differences in the mix of skills or job
characteristics.  Further, “high wage” firms exhibit high average tenures suggesting that positive
wage premia are associated with reduced mobility.  From these observations I conclude that
compensating wage differentials are also a poor candidate explanation for the observed
differentials. 
There are a number of possible objections to my results. An obvious one is that my data
does not represent a random sample of firms.  However, I think the fact that all of these firms
were engaged in layoffs makes my results all the more striking.  The obvious question is why
some firms would pay (or workers demand) wages above the apparent industry norm, when faced
with the necessity of laying off workers.  One suggestion is that dying firms are those that make
“wage mistakes”, that is, offer excessive or insufficient compensation to workers of a given
productivity.  If this were true, then my results would overstate the contribution of firms to wage
variation in the whole population.  I think this is unlikely for two reasons.  First, it implies that
“wage mistakes” cannot be corrected, even in the face of a plant closure and mass displacement.
Second, cross section wage effects are apparent in more representative data sets. 
This paper was in part motivated by the growing body of labor market theories that
suggest that firms and their structure have an important role in determining labor market
outcomes.  Team production models (Kremer, 1993; Rosen, 1982) suggest that firm wage effects
should arise because of the sorting of workers by ability.  While my results suggest that such
sorting cannot fully explain the observed firm wage effects, I do find substantial evidence of
sorting.  The correlation of firm wage effects across occupations is another prediction of these
models confirmed here.  General equilibrium search models (Burdett and Mortensen,1998) predict25
“true” firm wage differentials, as do efficiency wage models (Weiss, 1990).  The results presented
here confirm some of the predictions of these models and should encourage this renewed
emphasis on the demand side of the labor market.
The results in this paper should also raise some question about the utility of pooling data
across firms.  Evidently the returns to some typically studied individual characteristics are largely
driven by mean differences  across firms.  This can have important policy implications.  For
example, I find that the gender gap within firms is about half that which is observed in the pooled
data.  This in turns suggests that a good part of the gender gap is the result of the sorting of
women into low wage firms.  Policies which attempt to promote pay equity  within firms (policies
intended to address occupational sorting as a source of the wage gap) with obviously be
ineffective against  inter-firm wage inequality.
Finally, several authors (Carrington, 1992, Neal, 1995) have recently questioned the role
of firm-specific elements in generating the wage losses experienced by displaced workers.  The
evidence presented in this paper suggests that displacement from a particular firm may be very
costly; not, however, because of the loss of specific skills but because the firm paid a wage
premium.  Further, the large losses of high tenure workers may result from their concentration at
“high wage” firms, rather from their having accumulated more firm specific skills. 26
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APPENDIX 1: EMPIRICAL FRAMEWORK.
The empirical observation established by, for example, Groshen (1991a) is:
Where  T is a (n x 1) vector of residuals from a standard human capital wage regression,
zj is a (n x 1) vector corresponding to the  jth firm dummy, and  x is an (n x m) matrix of observable
individual and job characteristics which may (or may not) vary across observations of the same
worker.  Thus in cross section there appear to be "firm wage effects".  
Groshen proposes five explanations for this observation, which cannot be distinguished on
the basis of (1) alone.  In addition to confirming this observation, in this paper I report several
additional observations.  In particular I estimate
Where  T2 is the vector of residuals from a wage loss regression.
  )w is the vector of wage losses on displacement ( w2-w1) and I have introduced an index t=1,2 to 29
E[ T2z1 j| x2]’ 0 ￿ j (5)
indicate pre- and post-displacement respectively.  Implicitly,  x without a subscript may now
contain both pre- and post-displacement characteristics.  Alternatively I consider 
the covariance of post-displacement wages with pre-displacement firm dummies.  I also examine
the relationship between these conditional covariances across  j.  
In the sequel, I sketch several simple empirical models which capture several of Groshen's
explanations for (1).  I illustrate how they would generate (1) and derive their implications for (3)
and (5), and the relationship between these conditional covariances across  j.  In the main body of
the paper I present additional evidence on the plausibility of alternative models based on the
relationship between the apparent firm wage effects and mobility (as measured by average tenure
at the firm) , on the pattern of firm wage effects across occupational categories, and on the effect
on the estimates of firm wage premia of conditioning on different sets of covariates.
The first two explanations posited by Groshen suggest that the apparent "firm wage
effects" are entirely spurious, the artifact of a correlation between the firm dummies and omitted
variables in the wage regression.  If the omitted variable is an (fixed) individual characteristic, we
have a model of workers sorting between firms on the basis of unobserved individual
heterogeneity.  If the omitted variable is a unobserved job characteristic, then we have a model of
compensating differentials.  The other explanations listed by Groshen posit a "true" firm effect.
The empirical model I propose to capture these has a firm fixed effect. 
(1)  Unobserved Individual Characteristics.
Imagine that wages are generated by:30
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E[ w
)
)zj| x]’ 0 ￿j (10)
and that
For example, some firms hire workers that, conditional on their observable characteristics are, on
average, more able.  Then
and
Differencing, however, sweeps out the individual fixed effect so that this model implies
Since the wage premium earned by workers at apparent `high wage' firms is due to a portable
individual characteristics, these workers should experience typical wage losses. 31
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(2).  Compensating Wage Differentials.
Imagine that wages are generated by:




Clearly the implications depend crucially on the correlation of omitted job characteristics across 
displacement.  Consider two cases:
case 1: Imagine firms have homogenous technology, while workers have heterogenous
preferences. Post-displacement workers select the same position on the (single) isoprofit surface
that they occupied pre-displacement. The unobserved characteristics of their pre- and post-
displacement jobs are identical.32
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case 2:  Imagine workers are homogeneous in their preferences. Firms have different
technologies.  In equilibrium all workers receive the same utility regardless of what wage - job
characteristics bundle they receive (that is, all jobs lie on a single indifference surface).
Consequently they chose randomly.  The unobserved characteristics of their jobs are not
correlated across displacement and the unobserved characteristics of their post-displacement job is
uncorrelated with their pre-displacement firm.33
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then 
and
In a world with heterogeneity in both tastes and technology, both wage losses and post-
displacement wages will be correlated with pre-displacement firms.  Thus without a strong
assumption about the nature of heterogeneity, neither the wage loss or post-displacement wage
regression can provide evidence on the plausibility of the compensating differentials explanation
of Groshen’s result.
(3)  Firm Fixed Effects. 
Finally, imagine that wages are generated by:
where the  Zt is a matrix of firm dummies and  2 is a vector of firm effects.  Ztj is the jth column of  Zt34
     
15  Because of the number of post-displacement firms, it is not possible to control for them.
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Clearly the implications depend crucially on the correlation of firm wage effects across
displacement.
15
Consider a search frame work, with true dispersion of wage policies across firms. 
Workers know the distribution of wage offers, but not their locations (that is, they know that
some firms offer high wages, but not which ones).  If workers are homogeneous, facing the same35
E[ T
)
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offer distribution, they will all set the same reservation wage (making the standard search
assumptions such as search without recall).  In this case the expected wage is the same for every
unemployed worker (the mean of the offer distribution above the common reservation wage).
Differences in the wages a worker receives (conditional on observed characteristics) are random.
Hence a worker who is exogenously displaced from a high wage firm is no more or less likely to
find re-employment at a high wage firm than a worker displaced from a low wage firm.  Then 
and
Thus the wage loss regressions provide a direct estimate of the pre-displacement firm wage
effects.
This simple story breaks down if, conditional on observed characteristics, workers differ.
For example they may have different knowledge about the location of high wage firms.  More
simply, they may differ in the utility of search, if for example, some workers have higher non-
market income.  If this is true, workers who set a higher reservation wage while searching for the
pre-displacement job (and hence were more likely to work at a high wage firm) may set a higher
reservation wage again.  Hence workers displaced from a high wage firm would be more likely to36
be re-employed at a high wage firm. This implies 
E[z j1 'z 2|x t ] 2 > 0 iff  2j  > 0. (32)
The wage losses of workers displaced from a high wage firm understate those they would
experience if re-employed at a random firm.  Thus the wage loss regression provides estimates of
firm wage effects that (for both positive and negative premia) are biased towards zero.
These simple empirical models are summarized in Table A1.1.37
TABLES





of mean)  
Mean Real wage losses
(standard error of mean)
All Firms (1735) 8.24  (0.06) 1.07  (0.08)
Food1 (58) 8.58  (0.13) 1.39  (0.66)
Food2 (43) 6.62  (0.16) 0.47  (0.36)
Rbbr1 (415) 9.66  (0.08) 0.91  (0.14)
Lthr1 (57) 7.63  (0.26) 1.93  (0.30)
Txtl1 (217) 5.49  (0.06) 0.37  (0.18)
Txtl2 (191) 7.40  (0.18) 1.04  (0.18)
 Txtl3 (66) 8.40  (0.37) 1.05  (0.42)
Txtl4 (41) 6.54  (0.19) -0.48  (0.41)
Clth1l (53) 5.81  (0.15) 1.67   (0.25)
Papr1 (41) 9.17  (0.11) 0.90  (0.43)
Prnt1 (43) 7.52  (0.56) 0.47  (0.41)
Mchn1 (22) 6.98  (0.48) -1.79  (0.52)
Vhcl1 (44) 9.24  (0.28) 2.11  (0.41)
Vhcl2 (25) 6.71  (0.41) 0.17  (0.49)
Vhcl3 (191) 11.06  (0.10) 2.79  (0.27)
Vhcl4 (67) 7.21  (0.11) 0.43  (0.32)
Elec1 (42) 9.22  (0.39) -0.28  (0.63)
Elec2 (86) 8.79  (0.12) 1.95  (0.30)
Chem1 (33) 5.58  (0.26) -0.34  (0.35)38
TABLE 2: Explaining Wage Variation
Regressors  % of variation explained
(R
2)
human capital measures. 0.29
human capital measures, demographics. 0.47
human capital, demographics, job characteristics.  0.51
human capital, demographics, job characteristics, two-
digit industries.
0.65
human capital, demographics, job characteristics, four-
digit industries.
0.7
19 firm dummies. 0.57
human capital, demographics, job characteristics, firm
dummies.
0.73
human capital, demographics, job characteristics, two-
digit industries and 8 firm dummies.
0.73
human capital, demographics, job characteristics, four-
digit industries and 4 firm dummies.
0.73
Notes:
(1) the independent variable is log(real pre-displacement hourly wages).
(2) human capital measures: 5 age dummies, 4 education dummies, tenure and tenure
squared
(3) demographics: female and married dummies, their interaction,
(4) job characteristics: dummy variables for union coverage, blue collar supervisor,
white collar occupation, white collar supervisor, professional, manager.
(5) 10 two-digit industry dummies/14 4 digit industry dummies.
(6) the number of firm dummies decreases with increasing industry dissagregation as
firms become unique to an industry.
(7) based on 1735 valid observations.39
TABLE 3: Cross Sectional Firm Wage Differentials
manufacturing
 sector
2 digit industry 
controls
4 digit  industry
controls
Food1 (58) 0.153  (0.021) 0.113  (0.011) -----
Food2 (43) -0.112  (0.018) -0.152    (0.015) -----
Rbbr1 (415) 0.144 (0.008) ----- -----
Lthr1 (57) -0.053  (0.0.32) ----- -----
Txtl1 (217) -0.262  (0.011) -0.097  (0.009) -----
Txtl2 (191) -0.091  (0.011) 0.073    (0.009) 0.002  (0.008)
 Txtl3 (66)-0.041  (0.024) 0.124    (0.024) 0.053     (0.022)
Txtl4 (41) -0.190  (0.026) -0.025   (0.025) -0.096     (0.024)
Clth1l (53)-0.212  (0.028) ----- -----
Papr1 (41) 0.135  (0.013) ----- -----
Prnt1 (43) -0.116  (0.039) ----- -----
Mchn1 (22) -0.202  (0.052) ----- -----
Vhcl1  (44) 0.089   (0.019) -0.024   (0.018)  -0.090      (0.018)  
Vhcl2 (25) -0.206  (0.040) -0.319   (0.038)  -0.385     (0.039)
Vhcl3 (191) 0.250  (0.010) 0.138    (0.008)   0.071     (0.006)
Vhcl4 (67) -0.146  (0.020) -0.258    (0.018) -----
Elec1 (42) 0.094  (0.034) -0.021  (0.027) -----
Elec2 (86) 0.124   (0.015) 0.010    (0.013) -----













Table 4: OLS and Within  Estimates of the determinants of Log wages 
(Pre-displacement)
Coefficient OLS Within Estimate
age3 0.048  (0.022) 0.047  (0.018)
age4 0.118  (0.023) -0.115  (0.019)
age5 0.115  (0.025) 0.103  (0.020)
age6 0.066  (0.027) 0.089  (0.022)
educ1 0.086  (0.013) 0.028  (0.010)
educ2 0.152  (0.016) 0.053  (0.013)
educ3 0.200  (0.021) 0.091  (0.018)
training 0.052  (0.012) 0.026  (0.010)
tenure 0.013  (0.002) 0.005  (0.002)
tenure squared -0.000  (0.000) -0.000  (0.000)
female -0.183  (0.023) -0.104  (0.018)
married 0.058  (0.017) 0.050  (0.013)
female*married -0.119  (0.027) -0.063  (0.018)
blue collar supervisor 0.125  (0.025) 0.085  (0.020)
white collar
occupation
0.028  (0.017) -0.028  (0.014)
white collar
supervisor
0.197  (0.055) 0.180  (0.055)
professional 0.095  (0.033) 0.047  (0.025)
manager 0.288  (0.030) 0.236  (0.033)
union 0.022  (0.014) -0.079  (0.017)
observations 1735 87241
TABLE 5: Longitudinal Estimates of Firm Wage Differentials
Cross Section,





























Correlations of Wage Premia Estimates
Cross Section,



























0.257 0.3 0.019 142
TABLE 6:  Estimates of Firm Wage Differentials - Alternative Samples






























Correlation of Firm Wage Premia Estimates




















1 0.98 0.92 1
Paid Hourly 1 0.99 0.9 0.99 143























































0.83 0.81 0.82 144


























1 Food1 11 1700 133 308 7.4 98 37.2 10.1
2 Food2 -15 1000 54 2131 5.1 97 39.1 8.6
Textiles
1 Txtl3 12 899 113* 46 9.9 41 40.35 8.0
2 Txtl2 7 280 286 13 8.1 76 39.7 8.2
3 Txtl4 -2 150 73 35 8.2 77 39.8 4.6
4 Txtl1 -10 2800 240 73 6.1 92 40.46 11.45
Electrical Products
1 Elec2 1 800 141 273 3.5 98 39.6 18.1
2 Elec1 -2 4800 62 2131 4.1 2 40.0 7.1
Transportation Equipment
1 Vhcl3 14 350 253* 197 15.3 78 40.2 18.1
2 Vhcl1 -2 2500 66 5 6.2 76 40.2 13.0
3 Vhcl4 -31 350 75 2 8.2 0 40.7 3.3
4 Vhcl2 -36 34 36 2131 5.7 5 40.8 1.9
* Not a Plant closure.45
TABLE 9: Correlates of Firm Wage Premia
(regressions, 12 observations)
Variable




log(firm size) -0.019  (-0.57) -0.009  (-0.46)
dummy for union firm
(>50% report coverage)
0.122  (1.42) 0.054  (1.06)
% union at firm 0.183  (1.74) 0.082  (1.31)
log(mean tenure at firm) 0.161  (3.34) 0.091  (3.33)
log(local unemployment rate) 0.140  (1.29) 0.084  (1.39)








TABLE A1.1: Empirical Framework.
Model Empirical Covariance
E[ T1'z j1 |x 1] E[ T2'z j1 |x 2] E[ T)'z j1 |x]
Fixed Individual
Heterogeneity

























1. E[z j1 'z 2|x t ] 2 > 0 iff  2j  > 0.47




rpay1 8.25 2.46 2.01, 25.7 Hourly wage rate in pre-displacement job, deflated by the CPI
(June 1981 = 100)
rpay2 7.69 2.72 2.22, 23.1 Hourly wage rate in post-displacement job, deflated by the
CPI (June 1981 = 100)
rpayloss 1.07 2.39 -14.6, 14.8 rpay1-rpay2
lprew 2.07 0.3 0.70, 3.25 log of rpay1
lposw 1.98 0.36 0.80, 3.14 log of rpay2
lwdiff -0.15 0.32 -1.28, 1.28 lposw-lprew
dage3 0.24 0.43 1 respondent aged 25 to 34
dage4 0.23 0.42 1 respondent aged 35 to 44
dage5 0.24 0.43 1 respondent aged 45 to 54
dage6 0.18 0.38 1 respondent aged 55 to 64
educ1 0.36 0.48 1 1 if some secondary or high school
educ2 0.21 0.41 1 1 if completed secondary or high school
educ3 0.14 0.34 1 1 if at least some college/university
training 0.25 0.43 1 1 if some (other) formal technical training
tenure 11.8 9.1 0.17,42years in pre-displacement job
tensq tenure squared
female 0.34 0.47 1 1 if female
married 0.77 0.42 1 1 if married
femmar 0.25 0.43 1 1 if married and female
man1 0.04 0.19 1 1 if pre-displacement job in managerial occupation 
pro1 0.04 0.2 1 1 if pre-displacement job in professional occupation
wcsup1 0.01 0.11 1 1 if pre-displacement job in white collar supervisory 
occupation 
whcol1 0.14 0.35 1 1 if pre-displacement job in white collar occupation
bcsup1 0.04 0.2 1 1 if pre-displacement job in blue collar supervisory
occupation
preunion 0.7 0.46 1 1 if (self reported) pre-displacement job unionised
man2 0.04 0.19 1 1 if post-displacement job in managerial occupation 
pro2 0.03 0.18 1 1 if post-displacement job in professional occupation48




wcsup2 0.01 0.1 1 1 if post-displacement job in white collar supervisory 
occupation 
whcol2 0.15 0.35 1 1 if post-displacement job in white collar occupation
bcsup2 0.02 0.13 1 1if post-displacement job in blue collar supervisory
occupation
posunion 0.23 0.42 1 1 if (self reported) post-displacement job unionised
intell1 2.53 0.62 2, 5 general intelligence required in pre-displacement job
spatial1 2.24 0.52 1, 5 spatial reasoning required in pre-displacement job
strnght1 3.01 0.5 1, 5 physical strength required in pre-displacement job
manldx1 2.51 0.5 2, 4 manual dexterity required in pre-displacement job
risk1 0.41 0.49 1 1 if injury risk in pre-displacement job
cold1 0 0.03 1 1 if  exposure to cold in pre-displacement job
heat1 0.11 0.31 1 1 if  exposure to heat in pre-displacement job
noise1 0.58 0.49 1 1 if  exposure to noise in pre-displacement job
air1 0.33 0.47 1 1 if exposure to poor air quality in pre-displacement job
logpop 4.22 1.81 0.69,7.66 Log(population) of location of plant
unemp 7.8 3.01 3.5, 15.3 Unemployment rate in location of plant
lunemp 1.99  0.35 1.25,2.73 log unemployment rate
dreg3 0.09 0.28 0, 1 1 if pre-displacement firm located in Toronto
fsize 1111 1025 34, 4800 employees of pre-displacement firm in Canada, prior to layoff
lfsize 6.53 1.09 3.52, 8.48 log fsize
outtime2 20.4 5.2 1034 Elapsed time since layoff announcement, calculated from
individually reported information49
TABLE A2.2: Firms By Industry
Firm, location,
(Valid Obs.),






















1623 - Tire and Tube Manufacturers 16 - Rubber Products
Lthr1,  Kitchener
(45) [308]
1740 - Shoe Factories17 - Leather Products
Txtl1, Cambridge
(201) [2800]
1851 - Fibre Processing Mills  18 - Textiles
Txtl2, Lindsay
(177) [280]

















2890  - Publishing and Printing 28 - Printing
Mchn1., Ingesoll
(19) [225]
3150 - Miscellaneous Machinery
and Equipment Manufactures
31 - Machinery50
TABLE A2.2: Firms By Industry
Firm, location,
(Valid Obs.),














































8810 - Hotels and Motels 88 - Community
Business and
Personal Services
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